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ELIGIBILITY AND TAKE-UP OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR IMMIGRANTS AND NATIONALS: THE CASE OF LUXEMBOURG?¹

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Summary

Welfare states have developed within nation-states and were initially aimed at their own citizens. Migrants, however, are also included in Bismarckian insurances due to the link between work contract and insurances. With this in mind, then, what happens with non-contributory benefits such as social assistance? In this paper we tackle Luxembourg's social assistance, the Revenu Minimum Garanti (RMG). The legal framework of this benefit contains a residence condition which excluded all migrants and still excludes non-EU migrants.

By *differentiating immigrants via their educational level and migration status* (EU or non-EU) and nationals via their educational level (for both groups being more or less than a BA/BSc), we can demonstrate in a more contrastive way the "eligibility" and the "take-up" versus "non-take-up" of the RMG by the different groups. Given Luxembourg's strong highly qualified immigration, comparing just "immigrants" with "nationals", presupposing hence two homogeneous groups, would not have been appropriate. We used one wave of the PSELL 3/EU-SILC household panel and discovered a relationship between *eligibility* and migration status *only for the less qualified* immigrants and nationals with a very high eligibility for non-EU migrants, but an extremely small eligibility for highly qualified nationals and migrants. According to the regression analysis of *take-up*, there is no significant difference between nationals and immigrants for the less qualified. Hence we conclude that there is little consumption by the most vulnerable.

Since the late 19th century, welfare systems have developed within nation states. The best example of this is in Germany where - after the foundation of the German nation state in 1871 - Bismarck introduced the first insurance schemes for workers, forming a system which otherwise became known as the “Bismarck model.” This model was ‘naturally’ aimed at nationals – since, by that time, societies were not “challenged” to the same extent by immigration as today (Bommes and Halfmann, 1998). The Bismarckian model is a contributory system of insurances with the main pillars linked to the work contract: health insurance, pension schemes, accident insurance and, since a few years ago, care insurance. They entitle the employee or employer, with his or her family (partner and children), to use these insurances whenever s/he and the co-insured persons are in need.

In the case of insurances linked to work contracts, entitlement is guaranteed. Thus, immigrants have the same access as nationals: no exclusion is taking place. However, for all other benefits, and mainly for means-tested benefits, the question is: who should be eligible for these benefits and what conditions have nation states stipulated mainly with regard to immigrants?

“Migration” and “welfare systems in nation states” constitute, in a certain way, a ‘*contradictio in se*’ (Bommes and Halfmann, op. cit.): benefits are mainly aimed at nationals, but nation states are more and more subject to supra-national organisations (e.g. EU-institutions) with an increasing need to incorporate immigrants, at least those from other EUMember States (MS). These benefits have become /have had to become more and more accessible to immigrants. Globalisation, with an increasing influx of immigrants, has produced the effect that “national citizenship is losing ground to a more universal model of membership, deterritorialised personal rights” (Soysal, 1994: 3). Consequently, “citizenry becomes more and more uninteresting due to the fact that even foreigners have access to a lot of goods: benefits [...] election participation, collective bargaining” (Soysal, op. cit: 31).

Welfare systems *seem* to be challenged by the incoming and increasing shares of immigrants, as well as by the transnationalisation of social rights imposed by supranational organisations.

With regard to this framework, it is interesting to see how a small nation state like Luxembourg, where immigration is especially important and prominent, has handled the incorporation of immigrants, these antagonistic elements, and how actors – authorities and potential users (whether nationals or immigrants) – use more or less or do not use at all Luxembourg’s social assistance benefit, the Revenu Minimum Garanti (RMG). The question we will address is: are there differences of *eligibility* and *take-up* of RMG benefit with regard to immigration status and, if so, to what extent? This study will present the

characteristics and the impact of immigration in Luxembourg, as well as some key elements of Luxembourg's welfare system, before analysing migrants' and nationals' use of RMG.

What, therefore, can we add to previous research through this study? On the one hand, research debate has tackled eligibility and take-up of means-tested benefits with regard to the viability of schemes from *the perspective of potential users* and, on the other hand, has tackled the *sustainability of welfare systems* and the possibility of their being in danger if take-up is too high. On top of this, the role of migrants has been tackled: are they a specific supplementary 'burden' to the welfare system? Do they use these benefits more or less than nationals? Here research has tackled more so the sustainability of systems and less that of non-met objectives. We will analyse one of Luxembourg's means-tested benefits, the RMG, and compute the eligibility rate and take-up rate of this benefit for nationals and immigrants. This study will show the differences between those who theoretically would be eligible – *eligibility* - versus those who ask for it - *take-up* – and finally, those who receive the benefit - *receipt*. Our contribution will extend literature because it is the first on this issue in Luxembourg and is also the first study (to our knowledge) which does not focus on immigrants as a homogeneous group with working class background, but takes into account their educational background and their nationality. The same will be done for nationals, whilst in other studies both groups are mostly considered as a homogeneous group.

Up to now, there are no statistics available regarding the take-up rate in Luxembourg; we rely on studies which have been undertaken in other Member States (MS) (RMI in France, Sozialhilfe in Germany). Although the welfare benefit is not the same in each country, we will compare our results to those of the aforementioned MS, where some studies have used datasets comparable to those that we will use.

In a first step, we will give some information on immigration in Luxembourg, as well as a short classification of Luxembourg's welfare state and, secondly, will present our hypotheses from various studies on this topic.

Definition of immigrants and nationals groups

Luxembourg is both the OECD-country and EU-MS with the highest share of foreigners within the resident population (42 percent) and within the national² labour market (66 percent; 38 percent are cross-border commuters from France, Belgium and Germany) in 2006 (www.statec.lu). Luxembourg is a country with a strong double immigration, enjoying an important share of highly qualified immigrants (OECD, 2008, table 1). As opposed to other countries, where the inflow of highly qualified immigrants is a recent one, Luxembourg's economy has developed on the basis of this double immigration for more than a century. Just as in other OECD countries, authorities have been easing access for non-EU citizens with high wages over the last years, (OECD, 2003, p. 110). This selective immigration policy was meant to attract foreign brain, but also tried to avoid integration of immigrants who might fall under high risk of poverty – “eligibility” – and decide to take-up the existing benefits. The increasing educational level of immigrants has been demonstrated and, on average, the level of education of highly qualified nationals remains below the educational level of immigrants (OECD, 2008; Hartmann-Hirsch, 2008).

Lastly, Luxembourg attracted mainly an economic immigration: certain elements of the European and, consequently, national legislation may have had an impact on the fact that family reunion did not develop to the same extent as in neighbouring countries (Hartmann-Hirsch, 2007, p. 11ss) – despite a generous welfare system, which might lead to so-called ‘benefit shopping.’ This means that Luxembourg's immigration, being a predominantly economic one, is very performant and, thus, less “a burden” to the welfare state³ (cf. Hartmann-Hirsch and Ametepé, 2009). To an extent of 94 percent, immigrants are EU-citizens; within this group are the less qualified Portuguese as well as the highly qualified citizens of Northern MS. There is no correlation between EU citizenship and high qualification, such as that which Hoffmann-Nowotny (2001) designed involving the central versus the peripheral and semi-peripheral regions of the world.

In this study we choose an interaction between immigration status and educational level. Educational level is considered to be a proxy of professional status and wage. Our analysis will be done with five target groups: Highly qualified non-EU immigrants enjoy easier access to the labour market and, with this, easier access to the main pillars of social security as well as to other benefits compared to less qualified non-EU immigrants, given the aforementioned selective policy; hence we will have one group with **1. highly qualified non-EU and EU immigrants⁴**. For *less qualified immigrants*, non-EU citizens have to fulfill stronger conditions than EU-citizens, which is why we separate them into **2. less**

qualified EU immigrants and **3. less qualified non-EU immigrants**⁵. If we differentiate immigrants in terms of qualification, we must do the same for *nationals* with **4. highly and 5. less qualified nationals**. The threshold for high qualification is BA/ BSc (A-levels+3).

Luxembourg's welfare system

With regard to Esping-Andersen's (1990) liberal, corporatist-conservative and social-democratic (Scandinavian) welfare regimes (Hartmann-Hirsch, 2009), Luxembourg should be classified as a conservative/corporatist model with Scandinavian standards.

For non-contributory and means-tested benefits, two elements are taken into account: income with regard to the composition of the household as opposed to the individual person in the Scandinavian regime. In corporatist/conservative, as well as in liberal models, there is "equity amongst the poor" (Esping-Andersen, op. cit.): persons using social assistance benefits are stigmatised and live on extremely low means. In Luxembourg, as in *Scandinavian* countries, middle-class standards should avoid impoverishment and stigmatisation. Luxembourg is on top of EU or OECD countries in terms of financial provisions: for reimbursement rates of health insurances (OECD, 2008), for many benefits such as child benefits, for replacement rates of the pension scheme (OECD, 2007), and for social assistance as well.⁶

Regarding this last provision, Luxembourg and Denmark are on top of the EU-27. Considering this, one should take into account that Luxembourg, just as other Northern European countries, is a 'high wage country.'⁷

Within the corporatist philosophy, fear of abuse is common given the absence of what Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 28) called "an essentially universal solidarity in favour of the welfare state" as well as the aforementioned antagonism between the nation state's welfare system aimed primarily at nationals and not at immigrants. Given this very generous welfare system, it is interesting to show how this small nation state incorporated immigrants. Luxembourg's RMG, just as other benefits, is granted if, in a first step, two conditions are fulfilled: age⁸ and residence conditions. The latter is interesting for us as Luxembourg had a residence condition which was the most rigorous in the EU (Guibentif/ Bouget, 1997) asking for 10 years residence for claimants (law of 26 July 1986). This condition has been eased over the following years: it was 10 years (law of 16 June 1989) and, later on, became 5 years within the last 20

years (law of 29 April 1999). Due to a decision by the European Court of Justice, Luxembourg had to abolish the residence condition for all EU-citizens, but maintained it for non-Communitarians (2001). This kind of hesitation of opening-up of social rights can be taken as a *typical corporatist* way to “incorporate,” better to keep migrants away from welfare provisions as long as authorities consider them to be in line with supranational legislation (Soysal, 1994; Ametepe/Hartmann-Hirsch, 2009)⁹. Scandinavian countries did not stipulate specific conditions aimed at migrants. Their generous welfare schemes are immediately accessible for them. As opposed to Scandinavia, Luxembourg is geographically situated in the middle of countries with a corporatist welfare protection system *without* Scandinavian standards. This might explain authorities’ fear of ‘social tourism,’ the main concept which was introduced in order to keep the residence condition. Luxembourg’s RMG residence conditions is interesting for us as it tells us about the way Luxembourg handled the opening up of social rights for immigrants and, thus, the incorporation of immigrants (Soysal, 1994).

The Revenu minimum garanti (RMG) was introduced in 1986 (law of 26 July 1986) – later than in most of the northern and middle European MS, but earlier than in France (RMI in 1988). Both schemes (RMG and RMI) can be seen as a new generation of minimal help as both have been launched in a period of high unemployment, envisaging a high number of beneficiaries and a high share of beneficiaries amongst residents¹⁰, whilst those created in former periods were launched in times of high/full employment aiming at a small group of potential users. Some fear of abuse might be due to this historical context. Other elements, such as the geographical situation in the middle of other MS with corporatist welfare models without Scandinavian standards, might explain the fear of “social tourism.”

In the following section, we will tackle the empirical literature on eligibility and take-up and present our hypotheses.

Literature review and hypotheses

As the issue of eligibility and take-up of welfare is not documented in Luxembourg, we use the following overview of international empirical literature to have a background for comparison. In a first step, we will have a look at the debate concerning eligibility and take-up by citizens in general, and will then go on into research tackling eligibility and take-up by migrants as compared to nationals. Before reviewing the literature, however, let us now present the different concepts that will be used in this study.

The concepts of eligibility, take-up and receipt

Eligibility takes into account all persons who, according to the legal framework, would be theoretically eligible for the specific benefit, whether they claim it or not, and whether they receive it or not. *Receipt* refers to persons who are actually users of the specific benefit, whether they are entitled to it or not. *Take-up* refers to those who are entitled and who claim a specific benefit, receiving it or not, and *non-take-up* refers to those who, though they are entitled, *do not* claim RMG. Finally, *rejected claimants* include those who claimed the benefit, whether they were entitled or not, but did not obtain it. The first category (eligibility) contains all persons included in the third and fourth categories. In this study we use mainly eligibility and receipt, even if we refer sometimes only to receipt.

The issue of eligibility and take-up or non-take-up

Over the past decades, social assistance benefits have been launched in developed countries. This has been followed by research on eligibility and take-up of these benefits. On the one hand, research has tackled the sustainability of systems, focusing more on the “unfair” advantages of the poor who receive benefits. With ‘shunning work,’ a sort of ‘abuse’ of the system is identified (Coe, 1983; 1979). On the other hand, these studies have also looked at the issue of a too low rate of take-up in relation to political objectives of schemes: does the benefit system achieve the objective of decommodification, of lowering financial poverty (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The main question, then, was: do these schemes really help the neediest groups (Hernanz et al., 2004; van Oorshot, 1996; Kim and Mergoupis, 1997)? These various studies showed that in contrast to economic theory, individuals *often do not receive* benefits for which they are eligible (Riphahn, 2001). Within this perspective, the rate of take-up is considered to be one of the key efficacy indicators of benefits (Terracol, 2002): non-take-up or too low take-up is taken as a failure of the policy (Kayser and Frick, 2000) and reduces the quality of the redistributive system (Duclos, op. cit.). Take-up, rather, varies depending on the kind of welfare and is estimated to be between 40 and 80 percent for social assistance and housing, and between 60 and 80 percent for unemployment benefit (Hernanz et al, op. cit.).

There are various studies in the US on the take-up of US welfare programs (Blank and Ruggles, 1996) and on participation in the US food stamp program (Kim and Mergoupis, 1997). In the UK, studies exist on Supplementary Income (Duclos, 1995; Fry and Stark, 1987), on one-parent family benefits, and on family income support (Atkinson, 1989). In the States, the census's survey of income and program participation used by Kim and Mergoupis (op. cit.) shows that most of those who qualified for food stamps or for AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) are not marginal workers, but had simply earned too little or were in unstable jobs. A particular observation regarding these studies is that the vast majority of them are conducted in Anglo-Saxon and Germanic speaking countries (Hartmann, 1981; van Oorschot, 1996; Riphahn, 2000; Kayser and Frick, 1999), just recently in France (Terracol, 2002). Most of them attest the problem of accuracy of the dataset to calculate the take-up rate and show an important phenomenon of non-take-up.

In Europe, Duclos (op. cit.) has estimated a non-take-up rate of 20 percent for supplementary benefit (income support) in the UK and Blundell et al. (1988) computed a non-take-up rate between 25-34 percent for housing benefits. In Germany, Riphahn (op. cit.) and Kayser and Frick (2001) estimated a non-take-up rate of 63 percent for *Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt*¹¹. In France, Terracol (op. cit.) estimated a non-take-up of 48 percent for *Revenu Minimum d'Insertion* (RMI) and *Allocation Parent Isolée* (API), using raw data, and 35 percent using an alternative strategy. Mainly RMI is more similar to Luxembourg's RMG as both are part of the second generation of social assistance benefits having been launched in periods of high unemployment with a more explicit philosophy of professional reintegration.

The relationship between migration and this issue

Recently, this issue of take-up and non-take-up has been affected by the debate that immigrants are more likely to ask for welfare benefits than natives and, hence, they represent a burden to the welfare system. Several studies confirm this statement in the States (Borjas and Hilton, 1996; Borjas and Trejo, 1991) where immigrants are more likely to receive benefits in general. Unlike this observation, in Germany it seems, *ceteris paribus*, that immigrants are not more likely than natives to require benefits, but their claim for the benefit is due to a higher eligibility. In other words, falling under the poverty threshold occurs more with immigrants than with natives (Castranova et al, 2001).

Hence, some studies on the link between migration and the use of welfare find a positive effect. According to Borjas and Tejo (op. cit.), Borjas and Hilton (op. cit.) in the US, and Castranova et al. (op. cit.), Büchel and Frick (2004) and Riphahn (1998) in Germany, such a positive link has been confirmed. In other studies, however, the results are more mixed, such as in Canada where Baker and Benjamin (1995) found a negative link whilst Siklos and Marr (1998) obtained a positive relation. In Germany, Castranova et al (op. cit.) also found contrasting results.

Others explained different types of dependency on minimum income schemes with different legal frameworks, thereby contrasting a liberal nation state (United Kingdom) and a conservative nation state (Germany) showing that the latter does 'attract' more than the former. One might also ask whether generous welfare systems are an incentive for immigration; but no clear trend could be observed (Büchel and Frick, 2004). On top of this, immigrants in the United Kingdom are found to be a more homogeneous group than those in Germany (Büchel and Frick, 2004). What's more, Sainsbury (2006) also asks how the type of welfare regime (liberal, corporatist, social-democratic), the type of immigration (economic, asylum, family reunion), and the immigration policy have patterned immigrants' social rights within different countries and whether the retrenchment of welfare regimes was a higher burden for immigrants than for nationals. Finally, Pedersen (op. cit.) observes that the very diverse results can be explained by the fact that the research had been done in different historical periods based on different legal frameworks in different nation states, and on different benefit schemes with different types of immigrants.

For nearly all researchers, there is an implicit statement on homogeneity of immigrants, as well as of nationals, with immigrants predominantly being those with a working class background with some exceptions: Pedersen (2006) demonstrated little dependency on welfare for an inner-Scandinavian migration as opposed to a higher dependency of other migrants from the South.

In this paper, we will ask whether immigrants are more eligible to the RMG benefit, yet do not claim it? But more so, we ask, *which groups* of migrants and nationals are more eligible and is the gap between eligibility and take-up higher for less skilled migrants than for less skilled natives or for less qualified nationals than for highly qualified immigrants? With regard to the literature review and the context in Luxembourg, we assume that, even if immigrants are more eligible, they do not claim and receive the benefit more than nationals. We assume also that highly qualified immigrants with high wages are equally or less likely to be eligible than nationals with the same qualifications. As opposed to

former studies, we differentiate the group of nationals and immigrants in terms of migration status and educational level, which enables us to be more accurate and to distinguish the effects of migration status from those of educational level.

Luxembourg is a particular case because of its important shares of highly and less qualified immigrants being on the top and on the bottom of the socio-professional scale, and nationals being in a middle position. The top and bottom of the economy, mainly the competitive sector (73 percent), are in the hands of foreigners. The wealth that is produced in Luxembourg is, to a certain extent, the product of these immigrants at the top of the socio-professional scale (von Kunitzky, 2007; Hartmann-Hirsch, 2008). Luxembourg, as other OECD countries, is looking for selected immigration. We will ask whether immigrants are economically more dependent on social assistance, thus economically less performant – and, therefore, a “danger” to the viability of the welfare system. We will also ask, nevertheless, whether the redistributive philosophy of social assistance reaches the neediest groups, and whether immigrants are well integrated into the host society not being scared to take-up the benefit (knowing about it, not scared about administrative procedures, etc.). In the case of Luxembourg, the criteria for eligibility of RMG given by legal texts (26 July 1986) are the general income of the household¹², its composition, age, ability to work or not, and duration of stay for non-EU immigrants. A household is eligible if the actual global household income is below the defined threshold of RMG for the respective composition of the household. Note that for some components of this global income only 70 percent are taken in account in the computation of this global household income. This offers an opportunity to ask whether the take-up of RMG benefits in Luxembourg is due to immigrant status or, all else being equal, to other socio-economic characteristics?

Methodological issues and data used

The utility model of the take-up of social assistance

The empirical study is based on the model of welfare participation by Terracol (2002) with some modifications. We consider an actor with utility function $U(.)$ and basic income Y_t , as one who is entitled to receive welfare benefit B_t . When the agent is eligible, the duration of eligibility is unknown and we consider P_t as the probability of the duration of eligibility – a random variable. Costs to obtain the necessary information for eligibility are a one-off expense, labelled in this study as C_i . With the decision

to claim the benefit, the agent will face stigmatisation, which is labelled Cst ; this may vary over time. The two costs are positive and measured on the same scale as the utility function $U(.)$. The decision of the actor to claim (and eventually to receive) depends on the expected utility $U(Yt+Bt)$ and the communication Ci plus stigma costs Cst plus administrative approval A . If the amount of utility expected is higher than the costs of claiming (costs of information, stigma, administrative procedure) than not claiming, $U(Yt)$, the probability is high that those who consider themselves as eligible for the benefit will claim it and, in such a case, the net utility function would be the following:

$$Pt [U(Yt+Bt)-Cst-U(Yt)]-Ci>0 \text{ if } A>0.$$

This model predicts the probability of eligible users to claim (take-up), depending on the outcome (= the amount of the benefit) minus cost of information, of stigmatisation and of administrative attitudes and the existent income of the household.

According to the fact that income in formations in our data are not accurate and contains some errors and hence the eligibility criteria can vary, any estimation of eligibility and non take-up will not be satisfactory. Thus to provide some sensitivity information for our estimates, we also compute the eligibility to households whose income exceed slightly the threshold by x percent or fall short of the threshold by x percent (in this study x will be 5 and 20 percent)

In this study we will use the probit model to estimate the probability to take-up and to control various socioeconomic characteristics.

Data from a wave of panel study

For the analysis, we use survey data, the *PSELL3/EU-SILC* (Panel Socio-Economic Living in Luxembourg/European Union-Statistics on Income and Living Conditions). We use the data from the last survey of this panel in 2007 about income information in 2006 which included almost 3.500 households and 10.000 individuals; 8.000 of them aged 16 and more. The survey provides, on the one hand, detailed data on approximately 30 types of income (professional income, social benefits, etc.) and, on the other hand, other data on variables which allow us to calculate the eligibility of groups with regard to legal texts, e.g. the income situation, duration of stay in Luxembourg, etc. Definitely, however, survey data will never be as precise concerning receipt as administrative data would be.¹³ Our data includes

residents, whether they are nationals or immigrants, thus also international civil servants.¹⁴ This sample allows us to analyse the economic status and other socio-demographic characteristics of individuals and households. We built a dataset after matching individual and household data and our observation unit is the household under the specific eligibility conditions of RMG with some socio-demographic characteristics of the head of the household¹⁵ and some questions, such as various elements of the household's income (including market-income, non-market income and different public benefits aimed at all members of the household or at certain persons of the household) and the household's composition. The difficulty, however, is to transpose the legal conditions into our econometric analysis.¹⁶

Impact of immigrant status and educational level on being eligible for benefit and on take-up: analyses and results

Having a low educational level and being an immigrant significantly leads to being eligible

Considering the weighted estimation of our indicators (eligibility, take-up and receipt), Table 1 first presents descriptive results.

Amongst the survey households, 5 percent are *eligible*. Households headed by less qualified non-EU immigrants are most likely to become eligible. For both highly qualified groups, the poverty risk is low, slightly lower even for immigrants, which seems to be logical in consideration of their higher educational level (Hartmann-Hirsch and Warner, 2009). This might be an argument for a selective immigration policy.

Table 1: Eligibility (percent) for and receipt (percent) of RMG by immigrants and nationals (*proportion without residence condition*)

Nationality and education level of the head of household	2007 wave= 2006 data			
	Eligibility for RMG	Receipt in all households	Total weighted (unweighted)	Take-up within eligible
Highly qualified nationals	1,2(=)	0,1	217 (209)	-
Highly qualified immigrants	0,9(1,5)	1,1 ¹⁷	258 (390)	-
Normally or less qualified nationals	3,1(=)	1,6	1929 (1608)	51,4(=)
Normally or less qualified EU immigrants	10,3(=)	4,2	857 (1053)	40,1(=)
Normally or less qualified non-EU immigrants	27,8(34,2)	16,5	92 (103)	56,3(48,3)
All households	5,4(5,6)	2,6	3353	45,7(45,3)

Source: EU-SILC/PSELL, wave 2007, authors' calculations, weighted; in brackets: data concerning eligibility and take-up *without* the residence condition.

The almost 3 percent of households *receiving* the RMG within survey data is in accordance with administrative data. Most of them are less qualified non-EU immigrants. These findings confirm our hypothesis that eligibility might be high amongst the less qualified. However, there is an important heterogeneity amongst this group which is composed by individuals with university degrees (for instance Frenchs, Belgians and Germans immigrants) on one hand and people with only few years in school (for instance the first generation of Portuguese or Africans immigrants) on the other hand. Moreover, if we consider eligibility without the residence condition, this affects, logically, only the eligibility of less qualified *non*-EU immigrant households and shows to what extent the residence condition keeps these potential users away (figures in brackets: 28 percent versus 34 percent).


Unclear relation between the take-up with regard to migration status and to educational level

The take-up rate shows that more than half of the households who are eligible for RMG did not claim or receive it. The estimate of the non-take-up rate is lower than those found in Germany (Kayser and Frick, 2001; Castranova et. al., 2001), but closer to RMI's non-take-up in France (Terracol, 2002). We do not know why eligible persons do not claim the RMG: is it for reasons of stigmatisation, mainly in a small society? Is it due to a lack of dissemination? Or do these individuals fear reimbursement¹⁸ at a certain stage, etc.? Or do mainly immigrants hesitate to claim this benefit because, as pointed out by Bolzman et. al. (2004: p. 425), "they fear they will lose their residence permit"?

Given the decommodification philosophy, the take-up rate is 'too' low for non-EU immigrants; given the gap between their high eligibility and their low take-up, their economic performance, identical to their high non take-up, might be considered to be better than that of the equivalent national group. High eligibility and a quite high take-up of the same group – too low in terms of redistributive objectives - might be used as an argument in favour of a selective immigration policy with regard to the sustainability of the system.

Amongst all eligible households, 46 percent only receive RMG benefit, hence the non take-up is 54 percent. Why is there such an important gap between take-up (as well as receipt) and eligibility? There are general reasons for potential users, whether they are nationals or immigrants, but also specific ones for migrants.

Figure 1: Relationships between the different concepts use on receipt of the social benefit



Only a small proportion of households claim RMG, because the expected amount of RMG is low. How might this phenomenon be explained? The costs of take-up (fear of stigmatisation, fear of negative attitudes by the administration) are “not sufficient to compensate for the cost of claiming” (Groh-Samberg and Frick, 2008:6). Thus, take-up is low if the expected amount of a monthly welfare benefit is also low. For immigrants, the specific fear of expulsion might be a supplementary factor. We have no data on this as the household panel does not enquire about attitudes and motivations.

What effect of the simulation of household income on the eligibility and take-up rates?

The following Table presents a simulated entitlement to RMG using more and less stringent income criteria. In the first column a household is eligible if 120 percent of household income is below the threshold. It is the most severe criteria we apply. In the last column a household is considered as eligible if 80 percent of global household income falls short of the threshold. This is the less severe criteria. It is possible that incomes in our sample contain some errors. If the income is overestimated, the last column will help to get a more accurate picture of eligibility and take-up. In case where the income is underestimated, the first column presents a more accurate estimation.

The eligible rate is between 4 percent and 9 percent from the most severe criteria to the less (table 2). The gap is not so important. As more households become eligible while the criteria become less severe, the take-up rate decreases and therefore the non take-up rate increases. This rate is 38 percent for the most severe rule and 73 percent for the less severe criteria.

Table2: Eligibility and take-up rate by simulation of household income criteria

	Household income criteria : household income*(1 ±x)<threshold							
	x=20%		x=5%		x=-5%		x=-20%	
Nationality and education level of the head of household	Eligibility	Take-up	Eligibility	Take-up	Eligibility	Take-up	Eligibility	Take-up
Highly qualified nationals	2,4	67,1	3,0	53,6	26,6	49,0	6,1	3,3
Highly qualified immigrants	0,8	13,3	0,8	13,3	8,6	8,6	1,2	1,2
Normally or less qualified nationals	0,6	81,6	0,9	57,8	34,5	34,5	1,5	1,5
Normally or less qualified EU immigrants	7,4	55,6	9,8	41,9	24,8	36,4	16,6	11,3
Normally or less qualified non-EU immigrants	21,6	76,4	29,2	56,3	35,4	54,3	46,5	30,3
Total	4,0	62,4	5,2	47,9	5,8	42,5	9,2	26,9

Source: EU-SILC/PSELL, wave 2007, authors' calculations, weighted

The impact of immigrants' educational status is relevant to being eligible but not for the take-up

In summary of this descriptive analysis, one can say that the less qualified non-EU households are more likely to be eligible than natives, but there is not difference between the both groups to take-up – as opposed to findings for Germany (Castranova, 2001) and the US (Borjas and Hilton, 1996). With these findings, one might ask why less qualified immigrants' households are more likely to be eligible for RMG benefit but do not take-up and, consequently, do not receive the benefit in spite of the fact that they have a high eligibility for it. When people know that they are not eligible, as we noted above they will not start procedures due to the already high costs of take-up in the case of a means-tested benefit). However, other elements such as unavailable information, fear of stigma or expulsion etc. could also determine non-take-up. At first glance, it seems that the protection mechanism against abuse – “social tourism” - produces the expected effects, namely keeping non-EU immigrants away. However, these descriptive results ignore other specific characteristics of the households and heads of households. For instance, immigrants are, in general, younger than nationals and present higher employment rates, even if their income is, on average, lower. For this reason, and to obtain a deeper insight into *eligibility* for

social assistance and into *take-up*, we estimate a probit model including all other characteristics of the head of household and some household characteristics.

Are the estimated effects of immigration status and educational level statistically significant?

Nationality and educational level are used separately, in contrast to the descriptive analysis, to observe the specific effect of each variable. The previous results in the descriptive analysis show that the immigrants' households do not take-up more than nationals, even if their eligibility is much higher. Therefore, the question we tackle in this part is whether there are, *all other factors being equal*, differences between immigrants and natives with regard to eligibility and take-up, and whether, with similar characteristics, the high probability of eligibility is still the same for immigrants? Let us take a look at the results of this model in Table 3.

Immigrant status and educational level determine eligibility

In order to ascertain whether the effects of nationality and education on eligibility are robust, we present three models with the first model estimating only these two variables (nationality and education) and further models including other characteristics. The dependent variable is coded 1, if the household is eligible and 0 otherwise. The first model estimates only the effects of immigration status (the reference group being the nationals), and of educational level (the reference group being primary school). Here, we use another educational level variable to have a higher homogeneity within the different categories as compared to the previous variable used in descriptive analysis in table 1. Being immigrants' households (EU or non-EU) increases the predicted probability (more for non-EU immigrants) to be eligible for RMG benefit. The effects of EU immigrants' and non-EU immigrants' status are in line with the findings of the above mentioned research: being eligible is higher for immigrant households and even higher for non-EU immigrant households. With regard to educational level, one can say that eligibility decreases with an increase of the educational level.

We include the typology of households with the number of children and adults in model 2. This changes the likelihood of the model and it seems that these variables explain eligibility better. The effect of immigration status is still significant.

Finally, let us have a look at model 3 including characteristics concerning the head of household (sex, age, and marital status) and some information about job status, household localisation, and housing status, which improves the model more and more.

The result of model 3 shows that there is still a migration effect and that this effect increases after controlling for age, sex, marital status of the head of household and other explanatory variables. Eligibility does not depend on the sex of the head of household. Moreover, these results indicate a low effect for the probability of being eligible for widowed households as opposed to households with married couples.¹⁹ In this regression, the effect of immigration status remains significant, even if it is slightly reduced. These results are opposite to those found in the US by Borjas and Hilton (1996), but confirm the findings of Castranova *et al.* (2001) in Germany where the effect of immigration still remains higher than that of the composition of households and that of characteristics of the head of the household. In short, we found that being an immigrant increases the effect of being eligible; in contrast this effect is reduced with an increasing educational level.

Table 3: Social assistance (allocation complementaire RMG) eligibility (Probit with eligible RMG=1; 0)

Eligibility	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	coef	coef	coef
<i>Nationals</i>	ref	ref	ref
Immigrants from EU states	0,515***	0,600***	0,626***
Immigrants from non-EU states	1,223***	1,219***	1,089***
<i>Primary</i>	ref	ref	ref
Secondary	-0,226	-0,251	-0,309
Secondary with A-levels or other diploma	-0,389*	-0,425**	-0,444**
A-levels+3	-0,703*	-0,821**	-1,148***
More A-levels+3	-1,084***	-1,148***	-1,273***
<i>Couple with child</i>		ref	ref
Couple without child		0,326	-0,303
Single parent		0,679***	0,917**
Single		0,754**	0,976**
Other		0,300	0,509
Number of children		0,266***	0,300***
Number of adults		-0,167	0,248
<i>Man</i>			ref
Woman			0,188

Table3 (Continued)

Eligibility	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	coef	coef	coef
<i>Never married</i>			<i>ref</i>
Married			0,577
Widowed			-1,606***
Divorced/separated			0,402
Age			0,058
Age ²			-0,0004
<i>Employee/Self-employed</i>			<i>ref</i>
Unemployed			0,586*
Retired			-0,990**
Out of labour market			-0,339
<i>0 employed + self employed adult</i>			<i>Ref</i>
1 employed + self employed adult			-1,365***
2 employed + self employed adults			-2,138***
3 and more employed + self employed adults			-3,268***
<i>South</i>			<i>ref</i>
Center			-0,065
North			0,229
East			0,057
<i>Tenant</i>			<i>ref</i>
Owner			-0,525***
Intercept	-1,631332***	-1,981249***	-3,052***
Number of obs	3353	3353	3352
Log pseudo-likelihood	-625,2194	-581,28766	-435,26896

Note. Ref=reference category. * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Read note: 0,515: In the model 1, being the immigrants for EU states increases the predicted probability to being eligible than nationals,

Until now we have only presented the specific effects of migration status and educational level. For instance, households in which the head is an immigrant are more likely to be eligible, but it is possible that this effect is different by educational level. Through the analysis of the interaction between immigration status and educational level, we can test this hypothesis. Therefore, we create various categories through the combination of both variables. Hence, we can compare the educational level of each group of immigrants and nationals and the immigration status of each educational level through

the odds ratio of the different categories. The interaction between immigration status and educational level does not modify the effects of other variables; hence, we present only the corresponding coefficients.

The comparison of nationality by educational level

Let us consider the effects of nationalities by educational level. The results confirm that being immigrants with A-levels or less reduce the predicted probability for the eligibility (Table 4). Indeed, for a low educational level (primary school), the reduction of this probability is higher for EU immigrants and for non-EU immigrants, than for nationals, even it is not significant. We find similar effects for those who reached A-level. Unlike the aforementioned observations, amongst households in which the head reached at least a BA /BSC, the predicted probability of being eligible is reduced for EU immigrants and non-EU immigrants compared to nationals. Non-EU highly qualified immigrants (e.g.: Japanese, Norwegians, etc.) have the highest mean wages in Luxembourg (Hartmann-Hirsch, 2008). This result is in line with the hypothesis that highly qualified immigrants are equally or less likely to be eligible than nationals. De facto, highly qualified immigrants have also higher university degrees than the equivalent group of nationals. Their employment rate is higher and a small group of them occupy very high functions - given the highest mean wages (Hartmann-Hirsch and Warner, 2009). This can be considered the result of a selective immigration policy as well as a positive element for the viability of benefit schemes. Having a university degree, then, seems to be *the* educational level, which fosters "a returning trend" from being eligible to not being entitled.

Table 4: Interaction between immigrant status and education level on the eligibility of RMG

Education level	Immigration status		
	Nationals	EU immigrants	Non-EU immigrants
Primary	Ref	0,591**	0,746
Secondary	Ref	0,96	1,734*
Secondary with A -levels	Ref	0,656	1,310
A-levels+3	Ref	0,140**	0,548
More A-levels+3	Ref	-0,678***	-0,903**

Note. Ref=reference category. * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Read note: For A-levels+3 degree, being EU immigrants reduced the predicted probability for the eligibility for RMG than nationals.

The take-up of RMG is not correlated with nationality, but depends on educational level

In the following section we focus on take-up behaviour (table 5), in other words, we take only RMG-eligible households in the probit regression with a total number of 284 households; some of them are eliminated from the regression. This smaller sample will obviously generate higher standard errors of the coefficients than the former regression. However, there is probably enough variation in the data to get meaningful results for the variables of interest. We do several probit regressions with the dependent variable coded 1, if take-up, and 0 if non-take-up. Only the complete regression is relevant. It appears that take-up is not affected by how one defines their nationality. As opposed to this result, the educational level is significant and living in the households headed by persons with a baccalaureate educational level reduces the predicted probability to claim and obtain RMG benefit. This is also the case for those who reached at least A-levels+3 degree, but these coefficients are not significant.

Table 5: Social assistance (allocation complementaire RMG) take-up (Probit with take-up RMG=1; 0)

Take-up	Model
	Coef
<i>Nationals</i>	ref
Immigrants from EU states	-0,303
Immigrants from non-EU states	0,424
<i>Primary</i>	ref
Secondary	-0,576
Secondary with A-levels or other diploma	-1,337***
A-levels+3	-1,719*
More A-levels+3	-0,947
<i>Couple with child</i>	ref
Couple without child	2,465***
Single parent	-1,267
Single	-0,634
Other	1,249
Nb. Children	0,391

Table 5 (Continued)

Take-up	Coef
Nb. Adult	0,091
<i>Man</i>	ref
Woman	0,503
<i>Never married</i>	ref
Married	-3,177***
Widowed	-1,997
Divorced/separated	-0,834
Age	0,021
Age ²	-0,0001
<i>Employee/Self-employed</i>	ref
Unemployed	1,459*
Retired	-0,023
Out of labour market	0,496
<i>0 employed + self employed adult</i>	ref
1 employed + self employed adult	-0,094
2 employed + self employed adults	0,122
3 and more employed + self employed adults	-2,724
Amount of benefit if obtained (estimated)	0,0015***
<i>South</i>	ref
Center	-0,057
North	0,099
East	-1,650**
<i>Tenant</i>	ref
Owner	-1,825***
Intercept	-0,142

Note. Ref=reference category. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The model with interactions between nationalities and educational levels shows the effect of immigrant status by educational level, and only the results for EU immigrants with a baccalaureate and A-levels+3 degree are significant (Table 6). Thus, reached this degree reduced considerably the predicted probability to claim and to receive RMG benefit as compared to nationals with equal qualification. The small size of non-EU immigrants who are eligible does not allow significant results to be obtained.

Table 6: Interaction between immigrant status and education level on the take-up of RMG

Education level	Immigration status		
	Nationals	EU immigrants	Non-EU immigrants
Primary	Ref	0,033	0,643
Secondary	Ref	0,558	0,915
Secondary with A-levels	Ref	-0,424**	-0,554
A-levels+3	Ref	-2,377*	-0,659

Note. Ref=reference category. * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Conclusion

In this paper we have focused on the eligibility and take-up of RMG by nationals and immigrants in Luxembourg between 2002 and 2006. Within a corporatist welfare model with Scandinavian standards, with a predominantly economic immigration, an important highly qualified immigration and an important cross border exchange, this small nation state situated in the middle of other MS with corporatist welfare models *without* Scandinavian levels, tried to avoid “social tourism” by introducing a residence condition. Our main question was: who uses, more, less or not at all, RMG? Was the fear of authorities of ‘social tourism’ legitimate? With these questions in mind, we wanted to answer some of the research findings concerning a higher / smaller/ identical take-up by immigrants as opposed to nationals, always with regard to eligibility.

We find the eligibility rate of 5 percent and the non take-up rate of 54 percent. We also show that whether we allow for a twenty percent margin of error each way in our computation of eligibility, the rate goes from 4 percent to 9 percent. In line to this simulation, the range of non take-up also varies and when we allow for 20 percent margin of error the range is 38 percent to 73 percent. While applying 5 percent margin of error the range is 52 percent to 58 percent.

In terms of economic performance, we can consider non-EU less qualified immigrants as the weakest group being, to a high extent, subject to poverty risk. However, we do not know whether this dependency is influenced by obstacles they have to cross in order to enter the labour market. Less qualified immigrants are more likely to be eligible for RMG, particularly non-EU immigrants, compared to nationals, but the influence of immigrant status on the take-up of this benefit is negative. For the weakest group, the non-EU immigrants, residence conditions hindered de facto non-EU newcomers from becoming eligible and, thus, from taking-up, according to long-standing policies.

At the top of an economic performance scale, we find highly qualified immigrants and, in second position, highly qualified nationals. The low eligibility and take-up rate of highly qualified nationals and, even more so of highly qualified immigrants, show that immigration status has no influence on eligibility and take-up. However, the results of the probit model show, on the one hand, that migration status is significant, however more so for non-EU immigrants, and, on the other hand, that the 'turning point' for eligibility is a BA degree. Thus, our descriptive analysis, using both indicators (migration status and educational level), has been confirmed by the probit analysis.

At the top and at the bottom we find the two extremes, non-EU less qualified and highly qualified immigrants. In a middle position, we recognise highly qualified nationals who have nearly no eligibility and a very low take-up, whilst less qualified nationals have a relatively low eligibility, but a higher take-up than less qualified EU immigrants - the fear of "social tourism," which caused the residence condition, would perhaps not have been necessary. Is the nationals' higher take-up rate due to "better" integration (better knowledge of the existence of RMG, no fear of expulsion, etc.) or to lower economic performance?

At the top of an integration scale – measured via take-up – we find the less qualified non-EU immigrants, followed by the less qualified nationals and, in a last position, the less qualified EU immigrants within the descriptive analysis. Integration is understood here as being well informed and not scared to ask for social assistance, whether one is a national or immigrant. The analytical approach confirms the robustness of the matching of our two indicators.

For a deeper investigation of the determinants of eligibility and take-up, we use an interaction of immigration status and educational level. Even though immigrants are more likely to be eligible, this eligibility is less important for highly qualified, as compared to less qualified, immigrants, whilst highly qualified nationals do not show a significant difference compared with less qualified nationals. These results seem to indicate that the immigrants' group is more heterogeneous than the nationals' group – we find them on the two extremes of the wage scale. Furthermore, the gap between highly and less qualified "nationals" is very important in terms of income level and, if the latter are eligible, obviously the first are notably distinguished from them. It is not so astonishing that highly qualified immigrants (with a bigger proportion of very high degrees such as MA and PhD) are less likely to be eligible than nationals given their higher educational background and higher wages for the leading group.

A selective immigration policy might be considered to be useful for the sustainability of the welfare system in Luxembourg and elsewhere. Given our results, the fear of opening up was not necessary for highly qualified immigrants. Less qualified non-EU immigrants have a respectively low take-up rate given their high eligibility rate; obviously, they do not “abuse” RMG. Their situation on the labour market, however, is precarious as they are easily subject to poverty risks and, thus, eligible for RMG.

Pleading in favour of a selected immigration policy might be a means to maintain the sustainability of welfare systems with higher standards. However, we observe, even for a corporatist welfare system with the most generous standards, an important gap between eligibility and take-up by non-EU-citizens, thus there is reluctance to go for this benefit. Are they reluctant so as not to be considered a “burden on the state”? Is this reluctance due to a fear of being expelled? For non-EU-citizens, the weakest groups, the main issue is not abuse, but a very high risk of poverty and, thus, a potential long-term danger to the sustainability of systems. We do not know what would happen to the performance of non-EU, less qualified immigrants if all obstacles - those to RMG, but first of all those linked to the labour market - would be eliminated, thus allowing their economic performance to improve.

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Notes

¹ This paper was presented at the Migration DRC Conference 2008 held at the University of Sussex and, thus, benefited precious comments by its participants. We would also like to thank the following colleagues who commented on our paper after the conference: Frederic Berger, Jacques Brosuis, Joachim Frick and Marie Valentova. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from FNR (Fonds National de la Recherche Luxembourg).

² As opposed to the internal labour market, which includes all those who work in Luxembourg whether they are residents (foreign and national residents) or not (cross-border commuters): 320.000 in 2006, the national labour market includes all those who are residents in Luxembourg, whether they work in Luxembourg or in the border regions: 190.000 (cross-border commuters not working in Luxembourg: ca. 1.000).

³ To explain briefly: Free movement (regulation 1612/1968) concerns those who have/will have a work contract. Those who are not active have to prove their financial resources in order to obtain a residence permit. These have been evaluated, up until recently, whether they are higher than the equivalent amount of social assistance of the destination country. Luxembourg, being on top of the EU scale, in terms of the amount of = RMG, Luxembourg's authorities were “entitled” to refuse even EU immigrants with lower means; e.g. with the EU directives (1990/364

and 2004/38), elderly persons with a minimal pension from Portugal could be refused the residence permit and, thus, access to health and care provisions in Luxembourg (Hartmann-Hirsch, 2007). EU legislation was meant to hinder “benefit shopping” within the MS.

⁴ Splitting up this group would produce too small figures for statistical analysis with panel data.

⁵ EU citizens are awarded free access to the labour market and, if they have a full residence permit, they are also entitled to minimal benefits like social assistance, etc. (via regulation 1612/1968); this is not the case for non-EU citizens. A different treatment of EU and non-EU citizens is in line with European legislation (cf. anti-discrimination directives 2000/43 and 2000/78).

⁶ Cf. MISSOC and OECD, 2008, p. ; Hartmann-Hirsch/Ametepé 2009.

⁷ Luxembourgish middle class standards can be illustrated even better by looking at the provision of care insurance and other benefits for the elderly (Hartmann-Hirsch, 2009 to be published), as well as the replacement rate of pension schemes (OECD, 2007).

⁸ Law of 26 July 1986: minimum age was fixed at 30 years (the most rigorous in EU according to Guibentif and Bouget (1997) and lowered to 25 years with the law of 29 April 1999.

⁹ Even if non-Communitarians are not to be considered according to EU legislation, other supranational frameworks might consider this type of exclusion as discriminatory (e.g. the European Court of Human Rights).

¹⁰ Luxembourg never faced high unemployment, having used passive schemes (early retirement, disability scheme) to host the “unemployed,” thus having a high broad unemployment (OECD, 1997).

¹¹ In the States, the non-take-up rate is 64 percent for food stamps and 32 percent for AFDC (Kim and Mergoupis, op. cit.). Blank and Ruggels (op. cit.) found the same result in single mothers’ participation in AFDC programs.

¹² The need unit in Luxembourg is always the entire household (and not the family or the individual person), and never one or several persons out of the household: a typical element of the corporatist welfare system.

¹³ There might be incorrect reporting concerning the receipt, the so called “beta error”: the percentage of households simulated as not being eligible to the benefit, but receiving it nonetheless. Potential sources of beta error can be the gap between the time of survey and the benefit receipt or e.g. underreporting during the interview for fear of stigma, etc.

¹⁴ They do not include cross-border commuters who, in any case, are not eligible for RMG: this benefit is not exportable, but conditioned by ‘effective residence’ (regulation 1408/1971/CE).

¹⁵ In order to ease reading our text we use the term “less qualified EU household” instead of the more complicated “household headed by a less qualified EU citizen,” which would be the appropriate term/item within PSELL.

¹⁶ Thus disability is an important factor for eligibility, but we have no means to get information on this within the panel data. Fortunately, only a very small number of persons are concerned.

¹⁷ In fact, receipt must be lower than eligibility, but through raw data we know that there are some households which receive RMG even if they are not eligible for RMG according to our eligibility simulation model.

¹⁸ According to the RMG law of 26 July 1986, those who, in a future time, have the means (e.g. through inheritance) have to reconstitute their benefits to the State.

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Annex

Table A1: resident population

Groups in panel	Valid percent
Highly qualified Luxembourgers	10,3%
Highly qualified immigrants	11,1%
Normally or less qualified Luxembourgers	46,5%
Normally or less qualified EU ¹⁸ immigrants	28,4%
Normally or less qualified non-EU immigrants	3,7%

EU-SILC/PSELL, wave 2005, authors' calculations, weighted

Table A2: Eligibility for and receipt of RMG (allocation complémentaire) by some characteristics of household and of head of household

Variables	Eligibility	Number of households	Take-up
Sex			
Man	4,3	2111	44,7
Woman	7,2	1262	46,8
Marital status			
Never married	6,0	606	58,6
Married	4,0	1973	34,8
Widowed	0,6	400	6,8
Divorced/separated	16,4	393	53,4
Job status			
Worker	9,6	662	27,6
Employee	1,4	819	19,0
Civil servant	0,0	388	-
Self-employee	4,0	73	6,4
International civil servant	0,0	93	-
Other occupied people	4,3	44	42,1
Retiree	4,0	733	60,8
Out of labour market	13,1	561	61,9
Size of household			
1	7,2	973	52,0
2	3,6	936	68,3
3	4,5	577	36,7
4	4,2	723	27,6
5 and more	12,8	164	26,0

Number of adults			
1	8,9	1096	46,6
2	3,8	1893	37,6
3 and more	3,1	383	63,8
Number of children			
0	4,9	2090	55,4
1	3,7	520	59,2
2	5,7	626	32,3
3 and more	18,0	136	14,6
Housing status			
Tenant	12,8	923	53,1
Owner	2,6	2450	31,9
Total	543	3373	46,0

Source: EU-SILC/PSELL, wave 2007, authors' calculations, weighted

Table A3: Table 5: Interaction between immigrant status and educational level on the eligibility and on the take-up of RMG (complete regression model)

Variables	Eligibility	Take-up
<i>Primary</i>		
Secondary	-0,583**	-0,472
Secondary with bac or other diploma	-0,528*	-1,090
Bac+3	-0,948**	0,193
More Bac+3	-0,456	-1,840*
<i>Nationals</i>		
Immigrants from EU states	0,591**	0,033
Immigrants from non-EU states	0,746	0,643
<i>Primary-Nationals</i>		
Secondary-Immigrants EU	0,369	0,525
Secondary-Immigrants non-EU	0,988	0,272
Secondary with diploma-Immigrants EU	0,064	-0,457
Secondary with diploma-Immigrants non-EU	0,563	-0,089
Bac+3-Immigrants EU	-0,451	-2,410*
Bac+3-Immigrants non-EU	-0,198	-1,302
More Bac+3-Immigrants EU	-1,269**	-
More Bac+3-Immigrants non-EU	-1,649*	-
<i>Couple with child</i>		
Couple without child	-0,291	1,066
Single parent	0,946**	-0,090
Single	1,057**	-0,965
Other	0,559	-0,053
Nb, Children	0,326***	-0,114
Nb, Adult	0,268	0,360

<i>Man</i>		
Woman	0,157	0,254
<i>Never married</i>		
Married	0,586	-2,090***
Widowed	-1,612***	-2,364***
Divorced/separated	0,452*	-0,660
Age	0,057*	0,002
Age ²	-0,0004	0,0001
<i>Employee/Self-employed</i>		
Unemployed	0,671*	-0,428
Retired	-0,949*	-1,928*
Out of labour market	-0,264	-1,566*
<i>0 employed + self employed adult</i>		
1 employed + self employed adult	-1,327***	-2,326***
2 employed + self employed adults	-2,101***	-0,478
3 and more employed + self employed adults	-3,266***	-2,162
<i>South</i>		
Center	-0,034	-0,396
North	0,266	0,380
East	0,100	-1,388**
<i>Tenant</i>		
Owner	-0,506***	-0,712*
Intercept	-3,137***	2,391



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